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 NOTE 
Raising Our Standards: Rethinking the 
Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence 
MKB Management Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016). 
EC DUCKWORTH* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The controversy regarding abortion rights in the United States is perhaps 
the single most polarizing and heated domestic issue facing our nation today.  
According to the most recent Gallup poll recording American’s views on 
abortion, twenty-nine percent  of Americans believe abortion should be legal 
in all circumstances, fifty-one percent believe abortion should be legal in 
limited circumstances, and nineteen percent believe abortion should be illegal 
in all circumstances.1 
Abortion is an incredibly sensitive subject to countless Americans with 
personal beliefs often stemming out of closely-held ideologies rooted in reli-
gion and personal liberty, and any decision on the subject should be made 
with extraordinary care.  As such, when the Supreme Court of the United 
States is determining issues on this matter, it should do so with the utmost 
consideration, analyzing all implications of the potential reach of its deci-
sions.  Recently, Professor Randy Beck summarized the problem with the 
Supreme Court’s current abortion standard well: 
If the Court asks citizens to lay aside deeply held political and social 
views in light of “a common mandate rooted in the Constitution,” it is 
crucial to demonstrate that constitutional mandate to the contending 
parties.  Drawing a line as far-reaching and consequential as the via-
bility rule without a convincing constitutional rationale is more likely 
to aggravate the national division over abortion than to quell it.2 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2017; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  I would like to 
extend a special thank you to Associate Dean Paul Litton and the entire Missouri Law 
Review staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2016). 
 2. Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
249, 256–57 (2009) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67 
(1992) (plurality opinion)). 
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While the morally “right” or “wrong” issue surrounding abortion could 
be argued at length, this Note discusses taking a more reasonable approach in 
the analysis of abortion rights.  In implementing standards for abortion rights, 
the Supreme Court should either apply consistent measures of a fetus’s life 
that will maintain its practical implications over time or allow states to use 
the resources they possess to do so if the Court will not. 
Part II of this Note explores the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence 
by discussing MKB Management Corp. v. Stenehjem, which declared a North 
Dakota statute barring abortions after a fetus has a detectable heartbeat to be 
unconstitutional.  Next, Part III analyzes the relevant history surrounding 
abortion rights and the rationale behind the precedent relied on in Stenehjem. 
Part IV examines the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
to void the statute, along with the Eighth Circuit’s vehement plea for a new 
abortion standard.  Finally,  Part V of this Note reveals flaws in the Supreme 
Court’s current abortion jurisprudence and concludes with an outlook on fu-
ture challenges to the abortion standard. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 2013, North Dakota passed House Bill 1456 (“H.B. 1456”), later cod-
ified in North Dakota Century Code § 14-02.1, which expanded the state’s 
prohibition on abortion to the point in a mother’s pregnancy where the fetus 
has a detectable heartbeat.3  Prior to this bill’s enactment, North Dakota pro-
hibited abortion “[a]fter the point in pregnancy when the unborn child may 
reasonably be expected to have reached viability,” except when necessary to 
preserve the life or health of the mother.4 
In restricting the availability of abortions, North Dakota’s H.B. 1456 
contained two operative provisions.  The first provision required a physician 
performing an abortion to “determin[e], in accordance with standard medical 
practice, if the unborn child the pregnant woman is carrying has a detectable 
heartbeat.”5  However, this requirement was not applicable “when a medical 
emergency exists that prevents compliance.”6  Violation of the heartbeat-
testing requirement subjected the performing physician to disciplinary action 
before the state board of medical examiners.7  The bill provided, “Failure to 
 
 3. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016). 
 4. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04(3) (West 2016).  Further, the statute 
defined “viable” as: “[T]he ability of an unborn child to live outside the mother’s 
womb, albeit with artificial aid.”  Id. 
 5. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d at 770 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. 1456 § 1.1, 
63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013)). 
 6. Id. (quoting N.D. H.R. 1456 § 1.1). 
 7. N.D. H.R. 1456 § 1.2 (“If a physician performs an abortion on a pregnant 
woman before determining if the unborn child the pregnant woman is carrying has a 
detectable heartbeat, that physician is subject to disciplinary action under section 43-
17-31.”) (codified at § 14-02.1-05.1.2). 
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determine whether a heartbeat is detectible is punishable through a discipli-
nary action against a physician by the North Dakota Board of Medical Exam-
iners, which can include suspension or revocation of the physician’s li-
cense.”8 
H.B. 1456’s second operative provision prohibited a physician from per-
forming an abortion on a pregnant woman if the fetus had a “heartbeat [that] 
ha[d] been detected according to the requirements of section 1.”9  Exceptions 
were given if there was a medical emergency jepordizing the life or health of 
the pregnant woman or the life of another unborn child.10  A physician found 
in violation of this provision committed a felony, while the pregnant woman 
faced no liability.11 
MKB Management Corporation (“MKB”) and Dr. Kathryn Eggleston 
(together, “Plaintiffs”) brought suit challenging the statute’s constitutionality 
and sought a preliminary injunction.12  MKB is the sole abortion provider in 
the state of North Dakota and does business as “Red River Women’s Clin-
ic.”13  Dr. Eggleston is the clinic’s medical director and provides abortions to 
the clinic’s patients.14 
Plaintiffs requested preliminary injunctive relief to prevent Defendants 
from enforcing H.B. 1456.15  Plaintiffs argued that the “statute [was] an un-
constitutional abridgment of the right to abortion protected under the Four-
 
 8. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 954 F. Supp. 2d 900, 904 (D.N.D. 2013) 
(citing N.D. H.R. 1456 §§ 1.2, 3), aff’d sub nom. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, cert. de-
nied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016). 
 9. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d at 770 (quoting N.D. H.R. 1456 § 2.1).  Section 1 states: 
 
Except when a medical emergency exists that prevents compliance with this 
subsection, an individual may not perform an abortion on a pregnant woman 
before determining, in accordance with standard medical practice, if the un-
born child the pregnant woman is carrying has a detectable heartbeat.  Any in-
dividual who performs an abortion on a pregnant woman based on the excep-
tion in this subsection shall note in the pregnant woman’s medical records that 
a medical emergency necessitating the abortion existed. 
 
N.D. H.R. 1456 § 1.1 (codified at § 14-02.1-05.1.1).  See also id. at § 1.2 (codified at 
§ 14-02.1-05.1.1). 
 10. N.D. H.R. 1456 § 2.2.a (codified at § 14-02.1-05.2.2a). 
 11. Id. § 2.4 (“It is a class C felony for an individual to willingly perform an 
abortion in violation of subsection 1.  The pregnant woman upon whom the abortion 
is performed in violation of subsection 1 may not be prosecuted for a violation of 
subsection 1 or for conspiracy to violate subsection 1.”) (codified at § 14-02.1-
05.2.4). 
 12. Stenehjem,795 F.3d at 770. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  Dr. Kathryn Eggleston is a board-certified medical physician who is 
licensed to practice in North Dakota. Id. 
 15. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1061 (D.N.D. 2014), 
aff’d sub nom. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016). 
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teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”16  Plaintiffs’ primary 
contention was that the statute banned virtually all abortions in North Dakota, 
unconstitutionally banning abortions prior to viability of the fetus.17 
The North Dakota Attorney General and members of the North Dakota 
Board of Medical Examiners (collectively, “Defendants”) argued for the 
enforcement of H.B. 1456.18  In their response, Defendants argued that a fetus 
was viable upon conception19 and that H.B. 1456 was constitutional, as abor-
tions could still be performed until the point a fetal heartbeat was detected.20  
Further, Defendants contended that “a woman’s right to [an] abortion before 
viability was not absolute and must be weighed against the state’s interest in 
protecting the fetus and mother.”21  Thus, it was Defendants’ position that the 
implementation of H.B. 1456 provided a valuable state interest in protecting 
the life of an unborn child and protecting the physical and mental health of 
the mother seeking an abortion.22  In doing so, Defendants believed they were 
“preserving the integrity of the medical profession, preventing the coarsening 
of society’s moral sense and promoting respect for human life.”23 
The U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota granted Plain-
tiffs a preliminary injunction, whereupon Plaintiffs moved for summary 
judgment.24  In support of their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs re-
lied on the opinions of both Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Christie Iverson, a board-
certified obstetrician and gynecologist, as set forth in their affidavits.25  
Through their affidavits, both argued that fetal cardiac activity was not de-
tectable until about six weeks, and that the fetus was not viable until around 
twenty-four weeks.26  More so, they stated that since most women do not 
know they are pregnant until about six weeks, and with the clinic being open 
for abortions just one day per week, women would be limited in their ability 
to obtain an abortion to a single day during the pregnancy’s fifth week.27 
Defendants responded with their own expert, Dr. Jerry Obritsch, a 
board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist licensed in North Dakota.28  In 
his affidavit, Dr. Obritsch stated that fetal cardiac activity was detectable by 
about six to eight weeks, and that a fetus is viable from conception with the 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1062. 
 18. Id. at 1060. 
 19. Dr. Jerry Obritsch argued for Defendants that an unborn child was viable 
from conception because in vitro fertilization allows an embryonic unborn child to 
live outside the womb for two to six days after conception.  Id. at 1066. 
 20. Id. at 1062. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1061. 
 25. Id. at 1066. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1063. 
 28. Id. at 1066. 
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use of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), which allows the fetus to live outside the 
womb for two to six days after conception.29 
In granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the district court 
stated that “[a] woman’s constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy before 
viability has consistently been upheld by the United States Supreme Court for 
more than forty years since Roe v. Wade.”30  The court believed there to be no 
genuine issue of material fact, even though Dr. Obritsch provided a definition 
of viability that would satisfy constitutional precedent, his definition was not 
consistent with that of the Supreme Court or the medical community in gen-
eral.31  The district court held that “H.B. 1456 clearly prohibits pre-viability 
abortions in a very significant percentage of cases in North Dakota, thereby 
imposing an undue burden on women seeking to obtain an abortion.”32 
Defendants appealed this decision, contending that the trial court erred 
in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and that doing so was an 
abuse of the court’s discretion.33  On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that the 
North Dakota abortion law impermissibly infringed on the right to terminate 
pregnancy before viability, as set forth by Supreme Court’s precedent that 
states may not prohibit pre-viability abortions.34 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Abortion rights are by no means an unfamiliar topic for the Supreme 
Court.  First, Part III will provide the relevant legal history surrounding the 
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, providing a foundation for examin-
ing the law as it stands today.  Then, Part III will delve into the meaning of 
the illusory term “viability” and how this term interplays with the Supreme 
Court’s abortion standards. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe v. Wade, and 
throughout a large portion of America’s history, states have vastly encum-
bered women’s right to an abortion.35  However, in 1973, the Supreme Court 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1070. 
 31. Id. at 1073. 
 32. Id. at 1074. 
 33. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016). 
 34. Id. at 773. 
 35. David Masci & Ira C. Lupu, A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/
01/16/a-history-of-key-abortion-rulings-of-the-us-supreme-court/.  Many state abor-
tion laws enacted in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attempted to protect 
pregnant women and their fetuses by prosecuting those who performed abortions.  Id. 
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heard two cases, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, which declared state statutes 
barring abortion to be a violation of basic protections granted by the Constitu-
tion. 
In Roe, a pregnant single woman under the pseudonym “Roe” brought a 
class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Texas’s criminal 
abortion laws.36  These laws criminalized all attempts to procure an abortion 
– except for those performed with the purpose of saving the mother’s life.37  
In determining this state statute to be unconstitutional and in violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court developed the 
following guidelines: 
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, 
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical 
judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician. 
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first tri-
mester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, 
may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are 
reasonably related to maternal health. 
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its in-
terest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and 
even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.38  
In its decision, the Roe Court left “the State free to place increasing re-
strictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those 
restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests.”39  The Court stated 
that the physician maintained the right “to administer medical treatment ac-
cording to his professional judgment up to the points where important state 
interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.”40  The Court held 
that “the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a 
medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physi-
cian.”41  While recognizing states’ interests in regulating abortions, Roe pre-
vented states from creating laws that barred abortions during the first two 
trimesters of pregnancy.42 
 
 36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 164–65. 
 39. Id. at 165 (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (noting there were still exceptions making some restrictions permissible 
during the second trimester under Roe). 
 42. Id. at 154, 164. 
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In the Court’s simultaneous decision, Doe v. Bolton, Mary Doe, twenty-
three other individuals, and two nonprofit Georgian corporations promoting 
abortion reform, challenged Georgia’s abortion statutes and claimed they 
were unconstitutional.43  The applicable Georgia statute barred abortions – 
except in cases where continued pregnancy would endanger the pregnant 
woman’s life or injure her health, the pregnancy resulted from rape, or the 
fetus was likely be born with a serious defect.44  In each of these scenarios, 
this determination was to be made by a licensed Georgia physician in “his 
best clinical judgment.”45  In addition to requiring those seeking an abortion 
to be a Georgian citizen, the statute contained three further hurdles for wom-
en to cross: the abortion had to be performed in an accredited hospital, the 
procedure had to be approved by the hospital staff abortion committee, and 
the performing physician had to have approval by the independent examina-
tions of two other licensed physicians.46 
In its decision, the Supreme Court invalidated most of these procedural 
requirements to receiving an abortion, in line with its logic in Roe.47  Further, 
the Court stated that a woman could receive an abortion after a fetus was 
viable if necessary to protect her health.48  Ultimately, however, the Court 
followed suit with its Roe decision in saying, “[w]hether, in the words of the 
Georgia statute, ‘an abortion is necessary’ is a professional judgment that the 
Georgia physician will be called upon to make routinely.”49 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a 1989 Supreme Court deci-
sion that came out of Missouri, was among one of the first major cases chal-
lenging the Roe and Doe holdings.50  This case involved state-employed 
health care professionals and facilities offering abortion services who brought 
a class action claim against the constitutional validity of a state statue regulat-
ing abortions.51  Here, the Missouri statute required physicians to conduct 
viability tests on pregnant women at or past the twentieth week of pregnan-
cy.52  Further, the statute did not allow abortions to be performed at public 
facilities unless an abortion was necessary to save the life of the mother.53 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute while managing to avoid confronting Roe.54  The Court upheld the 
statute’s viability testing requirement by arguing that the State could have an 
 
 43. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 185 (1973). 
 44. Id. at 183. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 183–84. 
 47. Id. at 180. 
 48. Id. at 179. 
 49. Id. at 192. 
 50. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 51. Id. at 501. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 499. 
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interest in protecting the life of a fetus before the point of viability.55  The 
Court also upheld the prohibitions against the use of public facilities and em-
ployees for conducting abortions, justifying its decision by saying that the 
issue does not contravene the Court’s past abortion decisions.56  
The scope of abortion limitations was defined once again in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.57  In Casey, the Supreme 
Court implemented the undue burden test, as opposed to Roe’s trimester 
framework, for evaluating abortion restrictions before viability.58  Under this 
new test, a state may promote its interest in potential life by restricting the 
availability of abortions before viability so long as the law’s “purpose or ef-
fect is [not] to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion.”59  In analyzing whether a state abortion law met constitutional 
standards, Casey created a less rigorous standard than that set forth in Roe.  
While Roe required abortion laws to undergo “strict scrutiny” analysis,60 Ca-
sey required a lesser “undue burden” standard.61 
However, Casey did reaffirm Roe’s essential holding that women have 
the right to the choice of an abortion before a fetus becomes viable.62  The 
Court stated, “[T]he reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the cen-
tral holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we 
have given combined with the force of stare decisis.”63 
In 2003, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, prohibit-
ing a physician from knowingly performing a partial-birth abortion, a form of 
late-term abortion.64  This federal law immediately underwent judicial attack, 
and by 2007, the law was tested by the Supreme Court in the case of Gonza-
les v. Carhart.65  Although the Court had previously struck down a state ban 
on partial-birth abortion in Stenberg v. Carhart,66 here, the Court held that the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Act defined the banned procedure in clearer terms and 
upheld the statute.67  The Court further justified its holding by explaining that 
the Act only banned a procedure used in obtaining an abortion and did not 
prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion altogether.68  Perhaps most im-
portant, however, was Gonzales’s questioning of the continued validity of the 
 
 55. Id. at 519. 
 56. Id. at 511. 
 57. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 58. Id. at 837. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
 61. Casey, 550 U.S. at 839. 
 62. Id. at 846. 
 63. Id. at 853. 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). 
 65. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 66. 530 U.S. 914, 929–30 (2000). 
 67. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 149. 
 68. Id. at 156. 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/8
2016] RAISING OUR STANDARDS 527 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence.69  This questioning of the Supreme Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence was prominent in the decision of MKB Management 
Corp. v. Stenehjem. 
B.  The Meaning of “Viability” 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, viability is the point at 
which a fetus is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit 
with artificial aid.”70  In the instant case, the court determined this to be 
around seven months, but said it may occur as early as twenty-four weeks.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions have consistently held that the point of viabil-
ity was a matter of judgment for a physician.  As set out in Colautti v. Frank-
lin, 
[A] physician determines whether or not a fetus is viable after consid-
ering a number of variables: the gestational age of the fetus, derived 
from the reported menstrual history of the woman; fetal weight, based 
on an inexact estimate of the size and condition of the uterus; the 
woman’s general health and nutrition; the quality of the available 
medical facilities; and other factors.71 
Most state statutes also follow language similar to the Court’s definition 
of viability.  For example, Missouri defines viability as “that stage of fetal 
development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely 
outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems.”72  While 
the legal wording of what constitutes viability is consistent today, the under-
standing and the actual point of viability evolved over time. 
The roots of the term “viability” can be traced to the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, where abortion was discouraged after the onset of quick-
ening, which is the moment in pregnancy where the woman can feel fetal 
movements.73  In 1935, the American Academy of Pediatrics defined an in-
fant as being premature if she weighed less than 2500 grams at birth.74  While 
the Academy did not define a weight for viability, 1250 grams was often 
used, which correlated to approximately the twenty-eighth week in pregnan-
cy.75  By the 1950s, respiratory issues in infants younger than thirty-seven 
weeks were identified as the principal cause of death, leading to a distinction 
 
 69. Id. at 187 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). 
 71. 439 U.S. 379, 395–96 (1979). 
 72. MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 73. Bonnie Hope Arzuga & Ben Hokew Lee,  Limits of Human Viability in the 
United States: A Medicolegal Review, 128 PEDIATRICS PERSP. 1047, 1047  (2011), 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/128/6/1047.full.pdf. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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between “premature” and “growth-restricted” infants.76  Over the next two 
decades, there was an emphasis on neonatal technology.77 
In the 1970s, mortality rates of infants born under 1800 grams were 
“markedly improved” by neonatal technology.78  In addition, the medical 
viability standard changed.79  By the 1980s, smaller infants were successfully 
treated with more frequency, and the survival of infants born between twenty-
four and twenty-eight weeks had become an “expected possibility,” setting 
the contemporary range of viability.80 
Continued evolution of neonatal biological medical advances led to in-
creased survival rates for infants born at twenty-three and twenty-four weeks 
by the 1990s.81  Among a recent study looking at infants weighing less than 
400 grams at birth, about six percent of twenty-two-week-old infants sur-
vived, at least until discharged from the hospital, while about twenty-six per-
cent of twenty-three-week-old infants survived.82  These numbers illustrate 
the current contemporary limits of human viability.83 
Of course, simply surviving until being discharged from the hospital 
should not be the only factor considered when determining viability.  Factors 
such as the fetus’s expected growth potential and risk of developing later 
health complications should also be relevant in determining overall health 
compared to a fetus born later in pregnancy.  Premature births, defined as 
births before thirty-seven weeks, are notable for having a higher risk of health 
problems, compared to later births.84  These risks include complications such 
as long-term intellectual and developmental disabilities, lung and breathing 
problems, and vision problems.85 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
“Accordingly,” the Eighth Circuit noted, “we have no choice but to fol-
low the majority of the Court in assuming the following principles for the 
purposes of this opinion.”86  In its decision, the Eighth Circuit relied on the 
precedent laid down by the Supreme Court in Roe, Casey, and Gonzales in 
holding that “[b]efore viability, a State ‘may not prohibit any woman from 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1051. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Long-term Health Effects of Premature Birth, MARCH DIMES (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.marchofdimes.org/complications/long-term-health-effects-of-premature-
birth.aspx. 
 85. Id. 
 86. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016). 
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making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.’”87  More so, the 
court explained that a state may not alter this right by creating an undue bur-
den on a woman seeking to receive an abortion.88  This undue burden is said 
to exist if a regulation’s “purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”89  
However, simply placing a hindrance in the path to an abortion may not be 
enough to create an undue burden: 
On the other hand, “[r]egulations which do no more than create a 
structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of 
a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are 
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exer-
cise of the right to choose.”90 
In applying this standard, the Eighth Circuit determined that H.B. 1456 
prohibited abortions before viability and did not conform to the requirements 
set forth above.91  The court first noted that there was no dispute between the 
parties concerning when a heartbeat was detectable in a fetus.92  This was 
determined to take place at approximately six weeks.93  As this was not in 
dispute, the court simply had to determine when viability occurs to conclude 
whether the statute could be upheld.94 
Defendants argued that viability occurs at conception because IVF “al-
low[s] an embryonic unborn child to live outside the human uterus (womb) 
for two-six days after conception.”95  In contrast, Plaintiffs contended that 
viability occurs at approximately twenty-four weeks, as they understood via-
bility to mean “the time when a fetus has a reasonable chance for sustained 
life outside the womb, albeit with lifesaving medical intervention.”96  The 
court determined it was bound by the Supreme Court’s definition of viability 
and characterized it as the time “when, in the judgment of the attending phy-
sician on the particular facts of the case before him, there is a reasonable like-
lihood of the fetus sustained survival outside the womb, with or without arti-
ficial support.”97  Because the court felt Plaintiffs’ definition of viability was 
in line with that of the Supreme Court, the court determined viability to be at 
or about twenty-four weeks.98  Thus, as H.B. 1456 barred abortions at ap-
 
 87. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007)). 
 88. Id. (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146). 
 89. Id. (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146). 
 90. Id. (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146). 
 91. Id. at 773. 
 92. Id. at 772. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 773 (quoting Dr. Obritsch’s testimony at trial). 
 96. Id. (quoting Dr. Iverson’s testimony at trial). 
 97. Id. at 772–73 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388 (1979)). 
 98. Id. at 773. 
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proximately six weeks, it impermissibly prohibited women from choosing to 
have an abortion before the point of viability.99 
In the instant case, the court also made a strong argument for the Su-
preme Court to reevaluate its abortion jurisprudence.100  The court believed 
that the Supreme Court’s current viability standard has shown itself to be 
unsatisfactory, as it gives too little consideration to the “substantial state in-
terest in potential life throughout pregnancy.”101  The court continued, stating, 
“By deeming viability ‘the point at which the balance of interests tips,’ the 
Court has tied a state’s interest in unborn children to developments in obstet-
rics, not to developments in the unborn.”102  Because North Dakota developed 
a reasonable point at which to measure its state’s interest in potential life, the 
court believed the Supreme Court improperly “substitute[d] its own prefer-
ence to that of the legislature.”103 
Further, the Eighth Circuit argued that the Supreme Court should 
reevaluate its jurisprudence, as the facts underlying Roe and Casey have 
changed.104  The court believed the State’s evidence exemplified the balance 
found in Roe between the choice of a mother and the life of the fetus.105  
Here, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that many women do not have proper con-
sultation before receiving abortions and many do not receive adequate infor-
mation about the process.106  The court also stated that women who have had 
abortions may have adverse health consequences and many women regret 
having proceeded with an abortion.107  The court then concluded by discuss-
ing how the Supreme Court’s continued use of the viability standard dis-
counts the legislative branch’s recognized interest in protecting the lives of 
unborn children within the state.108 
V.  COMMENT 
There is little question that the Eighth Circuit correctly decided that 
H.B. 1456 impermissibly prohibited women from choosing to have an abor-
tion before the point of viability according to precedent set out by the Su-
preme Court of the United States.  As an intermediate court of appeals, the 
Eighth Circuit virtually had no choice but to uphold the principles the Court 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 774 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
876 (1992) (plurality opinion)). 
 102. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 861). 
 103. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Beck, 786 F.3d 1113, 1119 (8th Cir. 2015)). 
 104. Id. at 774–75. 
 105. Id. at 775 (quoting McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(Jones, J., concurring)). 
 106. Id. at 775. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 776. 
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previously established.109  Although the Eighth Circuit ultimately affirmed 
the district court’s decision to overturn the statute, the Eighth Circuit did 
make some very compelling arguments on why the Supreme Court may wish 
to reevaluate its jurisprudence in this area. 
A.  The Substantive Due Process Right to an Abortion 
While the underlying holding of Roe has yet to be overruled, it has be-
come clear that the original reasoning behind the holding, providing a sub-
stantive due process right to an abortion before the point of viability, has been 
weakened by a series of Supreme Court abortion cases.110 
For instance, in Roe, the Supreme Court found a fundamental right at 
stake – the right of a woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.111  
As such, and this being a substantive due process challenge, the Court applied 
strict scrutiny analysis in finding statutes barring abortions before viability to 
be unconstitutional.112  By its decision in Casey, however, the Court already 
appeared apprehensive to label the right to an abortion a fundamental right, as 
shown through a vehement dissent and the Court’s newly created undue bur-
den test.113  While this undue burden test was applied yet again in Gonzales, 
the Court characterized it as more of a rational basis test in saying that Con-
gress had a “rational basis to act” in refusing to allow partial-birth abortions 
due to the “uncertainty” of the medical necessity.114  In their dissenting opin-
ion, Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer stated, “[i]nstead of the 
heightened scrutiny we have previously applied, the Court determines that a 
‘rational’ ground is enough to uphold the Act.”115 
As rational basis analysis merely requires the government to have a le-
gitimate purpose in implementing a law, the government must simply act in a 
manner reasonably related to achieving that goal.116  Put differently, 
“[R]ational basis review, the most forgiving standard of constitutional scruti-
ny, nominally requires courts to establish as adequate the connection, or 
‘nexus,’ between the state’s legislative ends and its legislative means.”117  If 
 
 109. Id. at 772. 
 110. See discussion supra Part III. 
 111. See discussion supra Part III. 
 112. Supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 113. Supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 114. Supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
 115. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 187 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 116. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[F]or 
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pro-
nounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally 
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some 
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”). 
 117. Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational 
Basis Review in Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 279 
(2013). 
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rational basis scrutiny of state abortion laws was to be accepted, states could 
vastly expand laws that restrict a woman’s right to an abortion.  Theoretical-
ly, this would give states great latitude in creating abortion laws as they see 
fit for their populace. 
Cases such as MKB Management Corp. v. Stenehjem demonstrate that 
true rational basis scrutiny has yet to be routinely applied.  In Stenehjem, 
North Dakota’s legislature determined that the detectable heartbeat of a fetus 
was an appropriate measuring point for restricting abortions.118  As North 
Dakota determined this to be the critical point at which to protect its interest 
in human life, this could arguably meet the low or “nominal” standard of the 
rational basis test.  North Dakota could argue that it has developed an objec-
tive test that provides more consistent results than that of the ever-varying 
viability standard.  Further, North Dakota could argue that a heartbeat test 
provides emotional significance to its citizens, given the way the term “heart” 
is used metaphorically in society.119  While perhaps not reasons capable of 
surviving strict scrutiny, states could contend that these reasons meet the ra-
tional basis test’s nominal benchmark. 
B.  The States’ Interest in Regulating Abortions 
Even after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe, states were 
recognized as having some legitimate interest in protecting the lives of un-
born children.  As previously discussed, Roe left “the State free to place in-
creasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long 
as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests.”120 
Like the Eighth Circuit recognized in Stenehjem, a state may be better 
suited to determine the interests of its people than the Supreme Court.  States 
generally have the ability through their legislative branches to have thorough 
debates and investigations into recent medical and scientific advances and to 
develop laws suited to these discoveries and the wishes of their constitu-
ents.121  Further, as abortion is such a sensitive topic for so many Americans 
with no clear-cut “right answer,” perhaps the will of the people, and not the 
will of the courts, should decide what abortion policies govern their states.  In 
 
 118. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016). 
 119. Danny Groner, Why’s a Heart Represent Love, Anyway?, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 7, 2013, 8:13 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/danny-groner/whys-a-heart-
represent-lo_b_2635820.html (“It was around the Middle Ages that the heart symbol 
took on its current meaning.  At that time, according to Christian theology, it was 
meant to represent Jesus Christ and his love.”). 
 120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (emphasis added); see supra note 39 
and accompanying text. 
 121. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d at 774 (quoting Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So.3d 728, 742 
(Ala. 2012) (Parker, J. concurring)) (“By taking this decision away from the states, 
the Court has also removed the states’ ability to account for ‘advances in medical and 
scientific technology [that] have greatly expanded our knowledge of prenatal life . . . 
.’”). 
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line with this reasoning, it has been widely held that a court should not substi-
tute its own judgment or preference for that of the legislature.122  Although 
often criticized for being no more than a fallback answer as to why a court 
strikes down a heavily debated law, the argument maintains credence when 
the court gives no reasoned analysis for doing so.  Why should an arbitrary 
line pulled from the sky and decided by a split court govern a line represent-
ing the wishes of a state’s constituents and supported by a reasoned argu-
ment? 
As the court in Stenehjem articulated and as demonstrated in the forth-
coming Part, “[b]y deeming viability ‘the point at which the balance of inter-
ests tips,’ the Court has tied a state’s interest in unborn children to develop-
ments in obstetrics, not to developments in the unborn.  This leads to trou-
bling consequences for states seeking to protect unborn children.”123 
C.  “Viability” – An Arbitrary Standard 
As articulated by constitutional law scholar Professor Randy Beck, 
“[S]election of a rule near the extreme end of available options creates the 
appearance that the Court made a social or political decision, an impression 
that can be dispelled only by providing a convincing rationale for the viability 
rule grounded in neutral constitutional principles.”124 
Currently, according to Gonzlaes, “Before viability, a State ‘may not 
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her preg-
nancy.’”125  The United States’ viability standard falls approximately twice as 
far into pregnancy as that of the most common international standard of 
twelve weeks.126  Foreign standards, although by no means commanding au-
thority, were relied on in past constitutional analyses and often contained 
principles that the Court could embrace by citing traditional authority.127  
While a line must be drawn for the enforcement of almost any law, the cur-
rent viability standard for restricting abortions appears to create wide-ranging 
and arbitrary results.  While the same viability standard has existed since the 
1970s, the timeframe in which a state may restrict abortions has increased.128  
A twenty-four week old fetus in the 1970s would not have been considered 
viable, and thus would not garner protection from abortion, while today it 
 
 122. Edwards v. Beck, 786 F.3d 1113, 1119 (8th Cir. 2015) (“To substitute its 
own preference to that of the legislature in this area is not the proper role of a court.”). 
 123. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d at 774 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey 
505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (plurality opinion)). 
 124. Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
249, 252–53 (2009). 
 125. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 879). 
 126. Beck, supra note 124, at 267 (2009).  Data from the Center of Reproductive 
Rights shows that forty-one of fifty-six countries limit the availability of an abortion 
right within twelve weeks or sooner.  Id. at 264. 
 127. Id. at 262–63. 
 128. Edwards v. Beck, 786 F.3d 1113, 1118 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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likely would.129  This standard has allowed an entire class of fetuses to garner 
legal protection today while the same class would not have had the benefit of 
such protection before.130 
Thus, the standard provides differential treatment, as determined by the 
year of a fetus’s conception, linking a constitutional standard to an irrelevant 
factor.131  The Supreme Court went as far as to recognize this in its Casey 
decision, discussing how the viability threshold has moved several weeks 
closer to the point of conception than the time of the Roe decision.132  As 
stated in Stenehjem, “How it is consistent with a state’s interest in protecting 
unborn children that the same fetus would be deserving of state protection in 
one year but undeserving of state protection in another is not clear.”133  
Whether it is for or against abortion, a standard as fluid and arbitrary as the 
current viability standard is not a palatable solution. 
With the constant evolution of medical technology and advances in 
healthcare, it is only logical that the point of viability from a medical perspec-
tive would continue to expand.  Should we continue, then, to allow states to 
restrict abortions after the point of viability if the point of viability becomes 
almost immediate in the fetus following conception?  More so, the viability 
standard currently in place could provide mixed results simply due to the 
region a person lives in or the socioeconomic characteristics they possess.134  
Is the viability standard for the person with access to elite hospitals and ad-
vanced medical technology equal to the viability standard of the person 
whose only health access is a rural clinic?  Again, regardless of personal 
opinion on the subject, the reasoning behind such a standard must be ques-
tioned with such varying results.  While there are other legal standards cur-
rently in place that have different implications depending on locale,135 abor-
tion simply involves too high of stakes and is too controversial to be among 
those standards. 
D.  The Future of the Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence 
As long as abortion remains a hot-button topic in this country, it is sure 
to remain relevant in forthcoming litigation.  One such case appearing in the 
next session of the Supreme Court’s docket involves a Texas law requiring 
doctors performing abortions in the state to possess “admitting privilege”136 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Beck, supra note 124, at 258. 
 131. Id. at 259. 
 132. Id. at 258. 
 133. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016). 
 134. Beck, supra note 124, at 258. 
 135. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 
408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)) (applying “contemporary community standards” in analyz-
ing obscenity). 
 136. “Admitting privilege is the right of a doctor, by virtue of membership as a 
hospital’s medical staff, to admit patients to a particular hospital or medical center for 
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at a nearby hospital.137  Further, the Texas law requires abortion clinics to 
meet expensive operating standards and bans abortions after twenty weeks of 
pregnancy.138  After arguments were presented on how the statute was de-
signed to protect women’s health, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the statute in a reversal of a substantial portion of the district 
court’s decision.139  While the Supreme Court implemented temporary in-
junctions on some of the statute’s requirements for clinics, pending litigation, 
the statute has already had a dramatic impact on abortion rights within the 
state.  The number of abortion clinics in Texas has shrunk from over forty to 
just ten, and it is argued this number will be cut in half again if the statute is 
upheld.140 
While not a direct attack on Roe’s viability standard, statutes like the 
Texas law appear to be attempting to circumvent the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion and test the limits of Casey’s undue burden test.  Although these statutes 
do not strictly prohibit abortion against the Court’s viability standard, they 
make abortions unavailable or highly inconvenient for women to receive.  
The Court’s handling of this case, and cases similar to it, could influence the 
next wave of abortion-restricting legislation.  If upheld, statutes like this 
would surely arise in conservative states across the nation.141  If denied, it 
will be crucial to look toward the language of the Court’s decision to deter-
mine how broadly its opinion applies.  If narrowly tailored, it would be safe 
to expect pro-life jurisdictions to continue thinking of any available means to 
restrict women’s access to an abortion. 
In the Eighth Circuit, and Missouri in particular, similar measures have 
already been undertaken to make abortions more difficult to obtain.  The 
Eighth Circuit upheld a Missouri statute requiring that abortion providers 
have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals, holding that the requirement 
“furthers important state health objectives.”142  Currently, Missouri allows 
abortion up until twenty-one weeks and six days after a woman’s last men-
 
providing specific diagnostic or therapeutic services to such patient in that hospital.”  
Admitting Privileges (Health Care) Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL, 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/admitting-privileges-health-care/ (last visited Mar. 5, 
2016). 
 137. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 
F.3d 583, 587 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 138. Brittney Martin, Texas AG Asks Supreme Court to Uphold State’s Abortion 
Restrictions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 5, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://trailblazers
blog.dallasnews.com/2015/10/texas-ag-asks-supreme-court-to-uphold-states-abortion-
restrictions.html/. 
 139. Abbott, 748 F.3d at 605. 
 140. Taylor Wofford, Abortion, Affirmative Action and Other Supreme Court 
Cases to Watch This Session, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 6, 2015, 6:39 AM), http://www.news
week.com/supreme-court-cases-watch-session-380119. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Cty., Inc. v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th 
Cir. 1989). 
17
Duckworth: Raising Our Standards
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
536 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
strual cycle, at which point it is banned unless the woman’s life or health is in 
jeopardy.143  Additionally, Missouri currently requires a woman seeking an 
abortion to receive state-directed counseling seventy-two hours before receiv-
ing an abortion, as well as parental consent for minors seeking to receive an 
abortion.144 
In light of the recent controversy surrounding Planned Parenthood,145 
abortion policy is again a highly-debated issue in the Missouri Capitol.146  
Predicted Republican proposals for the 2016 legislative schedule on the issue 
range from requiring memorials for aborted fetuses to ramping up oversight 
of already established state abortion laws.147 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While the Eighth Circuit’s decision in MKB Management Corp. v. 
Stenehjem to overturn a North Dakota statute restricting abortions past the 
point of a detectable heartbeat in a fetus was legally sound, perhaps the great-
est takeaway from the decision was the court’s critique of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of abortion.  Public sentiment on either end 
of the abortion spectrum has become white noise to the Supreme Court in its 
abortion analysis, but who knows the impact that direct opposition from an 
intermediate appellate court could have?  The Eighth Circuit has clearly taken 
the position that the current standard for measuring when a state government 
can restrict a woman’s right to an abortion is unworkable, arbitrary, and in 
need of change.  Further, strong arguments can be made that the judicial 
branch should not make this decision at all, but rather, the legislature could 
handle the issue more effectively and thoughtfully.  Why allow states to con-
tinuously backdoor the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions on abortion 
rather than setting clear legal standards on the issue?  The future argument 
over abortion rights in the United States should not be decided in arguments 
of just or unjust, moral or immoral, but rather grounded in reason and backed 
by sufficient rationale. 
 
 
 143. Reproductive Health Services, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.planned
parenthood.org/planned-parenthood-st-louis-region-southwest-missouri/who-we-
are/our-services/reproductive-health-services (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
 144. State Facts About Abortion: Missouri, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/missouri.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).  In 
line with the national abortion rate trend, Missouri’s abortion rate has dropped from 
13.4/1,0000 to 5/1000 in women aged 15 to 44 from 1991–2011.  Id. 
 145. Missouri GOP Lawmakers Brainstorm New Abortion Legislation, 
SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Oct. 15, 2015, 6:32 AM), http://www.news-
leader.com/story/news/politics/2015/10/15/missouri-gop-lawmakers-brainstorm-new-
abortion-legislation/73974786/. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id. 
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